In general, it is believed that driver error causes a large proportion of road crashes, with some studies suggesting that human error has played a role in over 90% of crashes (e.g. Sabey, 1980; Treat, 1980). Although the role of human error in road crashes is substantial, such figures downplay the significant role that infrastructure can have in achieving Safe System outcomes (also see the discussion on this issue in The Safe System Approach).
When a crash occurs, road infrastructure has the most significant influence on the severity outcome of a crash. Improvements to infrastructure can contribute substantially to reductions in death and serious injury.
Findings from Sweden identified that road-based factors were most strongly linked to a fatal crash outcome. Stigson et al. (2008) reviewed fatal crashes based on in-depth crash investigation, with crashes categorised based on factors that contributed to the crash outcome (as opposed to crash causation). The study identified that there were strong interactions between the three system components (vehicles, road infrastructure and road user issues), but that road-based factors were most strongly linked to a fatal crash outcome.
Further evidence of the role infrastructure plays in fatal and serious injury crash outcomes can be found from research that investigates the benefits of infrastructure safety treatments. Various studies have identified that well-designed infrastructure (such as roundabouts and protective barrier systems) can reduce fatal and serious injury crash outcomes by up to 80%. This reduction can occur regardless of whether crashes were the result of human error (also see Design for Road User Characteristics and Compliance). For further information on effective treatments, see Intervention Selection And Prioritisation.
There is a strong economic argument for the provision of safe infrastructure. Examples exist from many countries that demonstrate the benefits from targeted road safety improvements. OECD (2008) identified that such targeted improvements can deliver up to 60 times the benefit compared to the cost (i.e. for every $1 spent, benefits of up to $60 in terms of crash cost savings can be achieved). As identified by the UNRSC (2010), few other infrastructure investments produce the economic benefits of infrastructure targeted at improving road safety. Even more substantial investment programmes are able to return substantial safety benefits when compared to their costs. An analysis undertaken by iRAP (www.irap.org) on improvements to road infrastructure on the worst 10% of roads (i.e. those roads with greatest number of death and serious injury) in each country identified substantial potential gains when comparing the costs with the benefits. The average over all countries was a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of 8:1 (i.e. $8 worth of benefits for each $1 invested). This ranges from a BCR of 5:1 in high-income countries, to 19:1 in upper middle income countries over a 20 year period.
A solid understanding of key infrastructure principles is required by road agencies and others responsible for delivering road safety. Some of the key elements of relevance to the development of infrastructure policy, standards, guidelines and tools include:
Guidance on the risk assessment process has been developed across many different industries and activities, including road safety. The process (briefly introduced in Figure 1) involves the identification of high risk locations; analysing data to determine the cause of this risk; identifying evidence-based solutions that are effective in addressing the risk; implementing these solutions; and then monitoring and evaluating the outcome. Each of these stages is explained in detail in Assessing Potential Risks And Identifying Issues to Monitoring and Evaluation of Road Safety.
In broad risk assessment terms, the chance of sustaining death or serious injury can be decreased by reducing the:
With an understanding of these factors, crashes can be influenced in a number of ways through changes in the road environment. As examples, improvement in safety can be gained from:
Engineering-based treatments generally work by influencing one or more of these factors. Examples of such treatments and their effectiveness can be found in Project-level and Network-level Approaches.
Standards, guidelines and tools are the mechanisms that support the consistent interpretation and delivery of policies. Policies set the framework for road safety activity, and without these, delivery of road safety is reactive and lacks structure. Guidance on strategy and policy development can be found in Road Safety Targets, Investment Strategies Plans and Projectsand in Development of Policies, Standards and Guidelines in Policies, Standarts and Guidelines.
Changing established practice is often difficult, and careful management of this process is required. Strong leadership is needed to facilitate policy shift, and this needs to happen in parallel with an update of standards and guidelines.
Once policies are set, there is need for linkage to standards and guidelines. Standards (as well as road rules and regulations) dictate those things that must be done and typically have a legal basis. Guidelines and manuals provide direction on how things should be done. In contrast to standards, there is scope to deviate from the advice provided in manuals and guidelines, but this must be justified and assessed for the impact on safety outcomes. Standards and guidelines are typically based on many years of experience and outcomes from research.
It is important to note that compliance with standards and guidelines does not mean that safety will be maximised, and there are many examples where new roads have been built to standard but have a poor safety outcome. Standards and guidelines are often dated, and may not include adequate content based on Safe System principles. Standards and guidelines generally offer the minimum acceptable criteria for design. Departing from the minimum requirements is usually at a financial cost that is higher than providing the minimum standard.
There is much to be gained by looking to other countries for guidance on setting new standards and guidelines, and such an approach is important for benchmarking (also see Country Management System Framework in Management system Framework and Tools). However, often guidelines are directly copied from other countries without due consideration of local conditions, particularly adequate design for vulnerable road users, different vehicle types and road user compliance.
Also, guidelines often provide fewer options for use in constrained environments. It is typical that several compromises need to be made in road design. When combined, these issues can lead to poor safety outcomes (also see the discussion in Global Level in Policies, Standarts and Guidelines on minimum criteria, and the concept of extended design domain). Typically, an assessment of the likely road safety impact is required to ensure that safety objectives are met. It is for this reason that approaches such as road safety audit (see Road Safety Audit in Proactive Identification) are required, and that when undertaken, these are not just a check against standards and guidelines.
Knowledge of the safety implications of design decisions is constantly improving, and with this there is sometimes a need to update policies and procedures. This includes the need to update standards, guidelines and tools.
Box 9.1 indicates how a policy decision that was initially driven by economic reasons at the political level has resulted in safer road design principles on major roads in New Zealand.
Delivery of road safety infrastructure does not occur in isolation, and it is important to consider broader safety, road management and societal issues when developing policies, standards and guidelines. Similarly, it is important to advocate for road safety outcomes when developing broader transport and related policies. The case study in Box 9.2 provides a useful demonstration of linking infrastructure improvements to other safety improvements. Land use measures have a strong linkage to safety outcomes, an issue that is often overlooked in LMICs. Such measures define the type and intensity of the generated traffic, and the way it enters and exits the roadway. A detailed discussion on this issue can be found in Impacts of a Safe System Adoption on roles and Responsibilities of Authorities.
The solution: In order to address this issue, two projects were initiated. The first involved a review of safety management capacity (see Building Road Safety Management Capacity) and work to reach consensus on a multi-sectoral investment strategy for improving road safety management capacity. The second involved a Road Assessment Programme to evaluate the safety of 370 miles (almost 600 km) of road corridors. Both tasks were completed in January 2012, and identified several key issues and constraints affecting road safety in Belize. The results and findings were presented at a two-day workshop with a cross-section of public and private sector stakeholders. Over the duration of the workshop broad agreement was reached on the priority investments for inclusion in a road safety project. In accordance with World Bank capacity review guidance, it was recommended arrangements be made to test the effectiveness of the approach; illustrate the efficacy of the investments; and to generate wider stakeholder support and demand. Accordingly, a demonstration corridor was selected by the stakeholders to illustrate the impact of improved infrastructure; foster cooperation among stakeholders; and integrate the enforcement, post-crash care and educational initiatives.
In May 2012, the Caribbean Development Bank approved a loan to Belize for a Road Safety Project, with further funding provided by the government of Belize. This funding was for a project on a demonstration corridor, and aimed at reducing fatal and serious injuries. The multi-sector project focused on five objectives:
In order to meet these objectives, the following project components have been undertaken:
The project will be managed by the Road Safety Unit.. Task Leaders have been appointed from the various line ministries, who are responsible for coordinating, managing, and reporting to the Road Safety Unit on their assigned project components. This unit is overseen by an Operational Steering Committee (OSC) which is a decision-making forum to direct project activities, monitor the progress of project components, and resolve implementation obstacles. Above the OSC, the NRSC provides a high-level, multistakeholder guidance and advisory body to government on road safety.
This principle of stakeholder participation is central to the government’s approach. The project was launched in March 2013, with wide stakeholder participation in the event. Each year there will be an annual review which will provide the opportunity for formative evaluation. Based on what worked well, and not so well, and stakeholders’ inputs, a revised work plan will be devised for the following year. This will allow the shifting of resources and focusing on what is actually contributing to the overall intended project result. The cycle, then, is repeated each year.
The outcome: This project is still being evaluated, but early results are positive. Fatalities have reduced by about 26% on the demonstration corridor, whilst similar parts of the network registered a slight increase (3%).
Source: Caribbean Development Bank, Mavis Johnson, and iRAP.
There are also links that can be made with broader policy agendas, as illustrated by the example in Box 9.3
The solution: In 2002, an 80 km/h zone was introduced on the A13, a motorway between The Hague and Rotterdam. The speed limit was reduced from 100 km/h to 80 km/h, which was strictly enforced by section control.
The outcome: This pilot project recorded a decrease of 4–6% of NO2 concentrations in the air, and a reduction of 10–14% for the contribution from traffic. The reduction in NOx emissions was about 13%. The speed reduction resulted in a decrease of more than 50% of injury crashes and had a positive effect on the traffic flow. Extension of the reduced limits resulted in promising early reductions in emissions and positive effects on traffic safety and noise.
Source: Van Beek et al. (2007), cited in OECD, (2008).
As a further example, asset management involves maintaining and upgrading road infrastructure, and this typically has road safety implications. It is often the case that planning and funding for asset management and road safety outcomes occur in isolation, and without adequate linkages between the two. Both activities are closely linked, with each directly influencing the other. Adequate knowledge of the safety implications of asset decisions is required when establishing policy and practice. Similarly, safety decisions can have a substantial impact on asset management (particularly costs for maintaining assets).
When considered in isolation, the two road management approaches are often thought to act in conflict. There may be a perception that increases in funding for road safety may mean less funding or increased expenditure for asset management. However, there is some clear evidence that the two can act in harmony to produce benefits that are greater than those that can be delivered when considered in isolation.
Specific examples from LMICs are scarce, but the example in Box 4 from Australia serves to illustrate the level of benefits that can be gained through a coordinated approach. Combining the safety benefits with those from asset improvements can often lead to better project viability. This issue is discussed further in Roles, Responsibilities, Policy Development and Programmes.
As part of the analysis that underpins the Department’s plan, a study demonstrated that where pavement reconstruction was accompanied by cross-section improvements, in general, total crashes were considerably reduced, with an estimated social cost saving of approximately AUD$36 million. The corresponding marginal benefit cost ratios (MBCR) improved from 5 to 9 when these additional safety and travel time benefits were included (i.e. society could gain $8 compared to $4 per additional $1 invested when the safety benefits were added). The significant increase in MBCR was because many of the benefits were not being counted, i.e. the asset managers did not account for the safety and travel time benefits of their programme, noting that 89% of the additional benefits were due to estimated crash reductions.
Whilst this is clearly a worthwhile achievement, the potential reduction in crashes for the whole network was identified as being up to five times greater if cross-section deficiencies were addressed independent of pavement reconstruction. Thus, maximising benefits requires consideration of total needs.